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CRIMINAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
THE DEBATE IN THE DNA CASES OVER THE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSION OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN
ERROR AS A CAUSE OF FORENSIC
MISANALYSIS
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
"It is no more correct to say that neutron activation analysis detects the
presence of barium and antimony than to say that a violin produces
music."
- Professor Melvin Lewis'
The advent of DNA typing evidence has been much heralded.2 Some
proponents of DNA typing have claimed that this new forensic technique
will "revolutionize law enforcement." 3 A massive body of scientific liter-
ature on DNA evidence now exists,4 and the number of law review arti-
* Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis; former Chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools. The author would like to express his appreciation to Mr.
Joseph de Ulloa, Class of 1991, University of California, at Davis, and Mr. David Kornbluh, Class of
1992, who served as the author's research assistants on this project.
1. Lewis, The Element of Subjectivity in Interpreting Instrumental Test Results, in ScIENTIFIC
AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 409, 430 (2d ed. 1981).
2. Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A. J. 66 (1988). See generally Thompson &
Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv.
45 (1989).
3. Moss, supra note 2, at 66.
4. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 17-8, at 110 n.196.2
(Supp. 1990); Bar, Kratzer, Machler & Schmid, Postmortem Stability of DNA, 39 FoRENsIC Sci.
INTL 59 (1988); Fowler, Burgoyne, Scott & Harding, Repetitive Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) and
Human Genome Variation-A Concise Review Relevant to Forensic Biology, 33 J. FORENsIC Sci.
1111 (1988); Fukushima, Hasekura & Nagai, Identification of Male Bloodstains by Dot Hybridization
of Human Y Chromosome-Specific Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Probe, 33 J. FORENSIC Sci. 621
(1988); Giusti, Baird, Pasquale, Balazs & Glassberg, Application of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)
Polymorphisms to the Analysis of DNA Recovered from Sperm, 31 J. FORENSIC ScI. 409 (1986);
Haglund, Reay & Tepper, Identification of Decomposed Human Remains by Dexoyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) Profiling, 35 J. FORENsIC S. 724 (1990); He, Jiang, Lu, Wang, Zhu, Wang, Shen, Gao, Liu
& Wu, A Study of Sex Identification of Trace, Dried Bloodstains Using a Y Chromosome-Specific
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cles analyzing DNA typing is increasing exponentially. 5 The controversy
over the admissibility of DNA evidence has even surfaced on the front
page of major metropolitan newspapirs.6
For the most part, courts have been receptive to DNA evidence.7 The
overwhelming majority of courts that have passed on DNA typing have
held the evidence admissible.' Some courts have already gone to the
length of declaring that the general reliability of DNA typing is judicially
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Probe, 34 J. FORENSIC Sci. 346 (1989); Honma, Yoshi, Ishiyamama,
Mitani, Kominami & Muramatsu, Individual Identification from Semen by the Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) Fingerprint Technique, 34 J. FORENSIC Sc. 222 (1989); Kantner, Baird, Shaler &
Balazs, Analysis of Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms in Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Re-
covered from Dried Bloodstains, 31 J. FORENSIC Sc. 403 (1986); Kobayashi & Marsuzawa, Sex
Determination of Bloodstains by the Use of a Ribonucleic Acid (DNA) Probe, 34 J. FORENSIC SCi.
1078 (1989); Kobayashi, Nakauchi, Nakahori, Nakagome & Matsuzawa, Sex Identification in Fresh
Blood and Dried Bloodstains by a Nonisotopic Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Analyzing Technique, 33
J. FORENSIC ScL 613 (1988); McNally, Shaler, Baird, Balazs, DeForest & Kobilinsky, Evaluation of
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Isolated from Human Bloodstains Exposed to Ultraviolet Light, Heat,
Humidity, and Soil Contamination, 34 J. FORENSIC Sc. 1059 (1989); Mederiros, Macedo & Pena,
M13 Bioprints Non-Isotopic Detection of Individual-Specific Human DNA Fingerprints with Biotiny-
lated M13 Bacteriophage, 43 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 275 (1989); Odelberg, Demers, Westin & Hoas-
saini, Establishing Paternity Using Minisatellite DNA Probes When the Putative Father is Unavailable
for Testing, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 921 (1988); Sensabaugh, Forensic Biology-Is Recombinant DNA
Technology in its Future?, 31 J. FORENSIC Sc!. 393 (1986); Schacker, Schneider, Holtkamp, Bohnke,
Fimmers, Sonnebom & Rittner, Isolation of the DNA Minisatellite Probe MZ L3 and Its Application
to DNA "Fingerprinting" Analysis, 44 FORENSIC So. INT'L 209 (1990); Westwood & Werrett, An
Evaluation of the Polymerase Chain Reaction Method for Forensic Applications, 45 FORENSIC SCi.
INT'L 201 (1990); Yokoi & Sagisaka, Haptoglobin Typing of Human Bloodstains Using a Specific
DNA Probe, 45 FORENsIC SCL INT'L 39 (1990); Yokai & Sagisaka, Sex Determination of Blood
Stains with a Recombinant DNA Probe Comparison with Radioactive and Non-Radioactive Labeling
Methods, 41 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 117 (1989).
5. Rg., Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CALIF. L.
REV. 665 (1989); Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45 (1989); Note, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need for a Na-
tional Data Base, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323 (1989); Note, The Admissibility of DNA Typing: A
New Methodology, 79 GEO. L.J. 313 (1990); Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable
Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1990); Note, The Admissi-
bility of Scientific Evidence: DNA Print Identifications, 19 STETSON L. REv. 245 (1989); Comment,
DNA Fingerprinting and Paternity Testing, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 609 (1989); Comment, DNA
Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REv. 903 (1988).
6. Kolata, Scientists Voice Doubts About DNA Tracking, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 29, 1990,
at A-I, col. 3. This article was published by the New York Times News Service and was reprinted in
newspapers throughout the United States. Fg., Kolata, Scientists: DNA Fingerprinting Not Reliable
in Court, Davis Enterprise, Jan. 29, 1990, at A-I, col. 1.
7. See generally Harmon, How Has DNA Evidence Fared? Beauty Is in the Eye of the Be-
holder, 1 Expert Evidence Rep. (Shep./McG.-Hill) 149 (Feb. 1990).
8. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWiNKELRiED, supra note 4, at § 17-8, at 82-83 ("In testimony before
the United States Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Judiciary Committee, Professor
James Starts has stated that '[b]y all reports some twenty or so criminal cases have been concluded
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/5
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noticeable. 9 Moreover, courts have tended to rule that any deficiencies in
the specific manner in which the analyst conducts the DNA typing test
affect the weight but not the admissibility of the evidence. 0
Although courts are virtually unanimous in finding DNA typing to be
a generally trustworthy technique,"1 two courts have excluded DNA evi-
dence.' 2 In a highly publicized New York trial court case, 3 People v.
Castro,14 the court not only acknowledged that "there is general scientific
acceptance of the theory underlying DNA identification,"1 5 the court
added that "DNA forensic identification tests ... are reliable and meet
the... standard of admissibility." 6 In a later Minnesota appellate case,
State v. Schwartz,"7 the court similarly conceded that "DNA typing is
generally acceptable."' 8 However, in both cases, the defense counsel
were not content merely to cross-examine the prosecution's forensic ex-
perts; rather, the counsel called their own experts to attack aggressively
the manner in which the prosecution experts had applied DNA typing. 9
Both courts excluded the evidence for the stated reason that the prosecu-
tion had failed to establish that the analysts followed proper scientific
procedures on the specific occasion when they conducted the DNA test
in question.20
at the trial level in some seven states where DNA matching has been welcomed, with nary a word of
judicial dissent anywhere.' ").
9. State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989).
10. Harmon, supra note 7, at 149, 150-51; People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct.
1989XSome courts "have indicated that [this] question goes to the weight of the evidence not the
admissibility.").
11. Jonakait, DNA and the Courts: Cases and First Impressions, 1 Expert Evidence Rep.
(Shep./McG.-Hill) 121 (Jan. 1990).
12. Id. at 123; State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); People v. Castro, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
13. Schmeck, DNA Findings Are Disputed by Scientists N.Y. Times, May 25, 1989, at B-I col. 5.
14. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
15. Id. at 989.
16. Id. at 995.
17. 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
18. Id. at 426.
19. Jonakait, supra note 11, at 123; Lewin, DNA Typing on the Witness Stand, 244 SCIENCE
1033 (June 1, 1989XIn earlier DNA cases, "[m]ostly the evidence has come in without any objec-
tions."); Williams, Conviction by Chromosome" DNA Faces Its Day in Court, 18 STUDENT L. 26, 29
(Dec. 1989); Note, DNA Typing: A Rush to Judgment, 24 GA. L. REv. 669, 688 (1990).
20. 447 N.W.2d at 428 ("While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has
gained general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific test
results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory's compliance with appropriate standards and
controls .... ); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1989)("the credible testimony...
clearly established that the testing laboratory failed to conduct the necessary and scientifically ac-
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In excluding DNA evidence for that reason, the Minnesota and New
York courts highlighted a critical, sadly neglected issue in the law of
scientific evidence: whether the proponent of scientific evidence must
present foundational testimony that the analyst complied with correct
scientific protocol in conducting the test offered in court.21
In part, the issue is so critical because the use of scientific evidence is
widespread and expanding.22 Modernly, the use of scientific evidence is
increasing at a rapid rate.23 The significant relaxation of the admissibil-
ity standards for scientific testimony is one reason for the increase. As
recently as the mid-1970s, almost all American jurisdictions24 subscribed
to the conservative Frye 25 test, requiring the proponent to demonstrate
that the scientific technique has gained general acceptance within the rel-
evant specialty. 26 Since that time, one-third of the American jurisdic-
tions have shifted to a more liberal standard of admissibility.
27
The issue is also vital because there is mounting evidence of a signifi-
cant margin of error in scientific analysis. 28 One authority estimates that
fifteen percent of all medical laboratory tests are in error.29 Several gov-
ernment-sponsored studies of laboratory proficiency3" have documented
shockingly high error rates.3" Significantly, many of the same studies
have found that the analyst's failure to follow sound procedure in con-
cepted tests ...."); Jonakait, supra note 11, at 123-24. See also United States v. Two Bulls, 918
F.2d 56, 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1990) (approvingly citing Castro and Schwartz); United States v. Jakobetz,
747 F. Supp. 250, 258 n.16 (D.Vt. 1990); Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436, 441-42
(1990) (approvingly citing Castro and Schwartz).
21. See generally Harmon, supra note 7, at 150-51.
22. In 1980, the National Center for State Courts published the results of a nationwide survey
of litigators. Study to Investigate use of Scientific Evidence, 7 NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE CTs. REP.
1 (Aug. 1980). The center reported that roughly half the litigators surveyed encountered scientific
testimony in approximately one-third of their trials. Id.
23. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trial: The Reliability of
Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1988).
24. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating
the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261, 264 (1981).
25. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26. See generally Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Hal/-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
27. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspec-
tive of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554, 557-59 (1983).
28. See infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
29. Bechtel, Medical Tests: Don't Bet Your Life on Them, PREVENTION, Jan. 1983, at 55.
30. J. PETERSON, E. FABRICANT & K. FIELD, CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TEsNO
RESEARCH PROGRAM (1978); Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of CDC
Blind Study, 253 J. A.M.A. 2382 (1985).
31. Giannelli, supra note 23, at 688-95.
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ducting the test is one of the most common causes of laboratory
misanalysis3 2
Despite the crucial importance of the issue, the commentators and
courts have largely neglected the question of whether the proponent
should be required to make an affirmative foundational showing that the
analyst complied with proper scientific protocol during the test in ques-
tion. Many leading treatises on scientific evidence concentrate on the
foundational element of proof of the general trustworthiness of the scien-
tific technique while slighting the question of whether the analyst prop-
erly applied the technique in the instant case.33 The treatises that
address the question typically make short shrift of it. 4
Like the treatise writers, the courts often neglect the issue. Worse still,
the courts that have addressed the issue are badly divided. In some juris-
dictions, deficiencies in the manner of conducting the test affect only the
weight of the evidence.3 5 In the words of one court, "Careless testing
affects the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility .... "3 6  In
contrast, other jurisdictions require that the proponent make a founda-
tional showing that the analyst correctly applied the scientific technique
in the case at bar.37 Some of these courts demand strict compliance with
correct test protocol, 3 8 while other courts are content with proof of sub-
stantial compliance.39 Unfortunately, in many, if not most of the decided
cases, the courts' analyses are conclusory in the extreme. Courts not
32. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
33. E.g., A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
§ 1.03 (3d ed. 1986); J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 6.1-.3 (2d ed. 1961).
34. J. TARANTINO, STRATEGIC USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.05, at 6 (1988) devotes a
single, brief paragraph to "[tihe validity of the application of a scientific technique ...."
35. Id.; I D. NICHOLS, DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION § 14.42, at 48-49 (1985); Harmon,
supra note 7, at 150-51; Note, supra note 19, at 686.
36. People v. Farmer, 47 Cal. 3d 888, 913, 765 P.2d 940, 956, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 524 (1989).
37. Id.; State v. Lowther, 740 P.2d 1017, 1020 n.5 (Haw. App. 1987); Romano v. Kim-
melman, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 199 A.2d 809 (1964); State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.7 (Utah 1989) ("Of course, even if the court ultimately decides,
either on grounds of judicial notice or after an evidentiary hearing, that there is an adequate founda-
tional basis for finding that the scientific principles or techniques are inherently reliable, that deter-
mination will not resolve the question of whether a particular piece of expert testimony may be
admitted. The trial court must still make a separate determination that there is an adequate founda-
tion for the proposed testimony, i.e., that the scientific principles or techniques have been properly
applied to the facts of the particular case ... "); 2 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING
CASES: CRIMINAL-CIVIL § 22.06 [4] (3d ed. 1989); 1 D. NICHOLS, supra note 35, at § 14.42.




Washington University Open Scholarship
24 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
only neglect the merits of the policy question of whether the proponent
should be obliged to make a foundational showing of proper test proce-
dure; courts do not even acknowledge the existence of a sharp split of
authority over the issue.'
The purpose of this Article is to evaluate that split of authority. The
first part of the Article addresses the threshold question of whether defi-
ciencies in test protocol should affect the admissibility as well as the
weight of scientific testimony. After surveying the empirical studies of
laboratory proficiency, the Article concludes that correct test procedure
is such a fundamental concern that it should impact the admissibility of
scientific evidence. The second part of the Article turns to the question
of whether the proponent or opponent should be allocated the burden of
showing the analyst's compliance with proper scientific protocol. Analo-
gizing to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) governing the hearsay excep-
tion for official records, 4' the Article advances the novel proposal that
the party opposing the admission of scientific testimony should be as-
signed the burden on this issue.
I. SHOULD DEFICIENCIES IN TEST PROCEDURE AFFECT THE
ADMISSIBILITY AS WELL AS THE WEIGHT OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE?
For several reasons, in structuring the admissibility standard for scien-
tific evidence, courts should treat the question of the use of proper test
procedures as a factor affecting the admissibility and not merely the
weight of the evidence.
A. The General Requirement for a Foundation for Admitting Scientific
Evidence
In some cases, although a factor is relevant to assessing the trustwor-
thiness of evidence, evidence law treats the factor as affecting only the
weight of the item of evidence. A classic example is a brief gap in the
proof of a chain of custody for an item of physical evidence. Suppose, for
instance, that for a small part of the accountable period, there is no af-
firmative showing of the safeguarding of an item of physical evidence
which a party desires to introduce at trial. No facts indicate that there
40. E.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
41. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
[Vol. 69:19
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has been any tampering with the item,42 but there is a technical break in
the chain43 in the sense that evidence of safekeeping during the time gap
is missing.' In this scenario, a legion of cases holds that the gap affects
only the weight of the physical evidence and not its admissibility.45
Courts uphold the chain and admit the physical evidence even when the
undisputed facts indicate that for a short period of time the object was
left unattended' or in an insecure area.47 The rationale for the result in
these cases is straightforward: the courts reason that the gap creates a
mere theoretical possibility that the evidence offered at trial is untrust-
worthy.48 Handling physical evidence is a simple, "mechanical" func-
tion,49 and without more, the gap gives rise to only a remote risk of
mishandling.
When the issue, however, is the trustworthiness of scientific evidence,
courts generally cannot dismiss the possibility of error as purely theoreti-
cal or minimal.5 0 Studies have established impressive evidence of a sub-
stantial error margin in contemporary laboratory analysis. In the 1950s
the American Academy of Forensic Sciences' Toxicology Section con-
ducted a study of the accuracy of blood alcohol analyses. That study
42. United States v. Dickerson, 857 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gate-
wood, 786 F.2d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wood, 695 F.2d 459,462 (10th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Malone, 558 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1977); Nash v. State, 267 Ark. 870, 872, 591
S.W.2d 670, 672 (App. 1979); Patterson v. State, 598 SW.2d 265, 270 (rex. Crim. App. 1980).
43. United States v. Casto, 889 F.2d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1164
(1990).
44. United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988).
45. Eg., United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1116-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988); United States v.
Wheeler, 800 F.2d 100, 106 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lopez, 758 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 785 (7th Cir.
1984); United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 724 F.2d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1984); Harmon v. Anderson,
495 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Belcher v. State, 661 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983);
McWherter v. State, 607 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
46. United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934,
vacated sub nom. Schreiner v. United States, 404 U.S. 67 (1971); State v. Smith, 284 Mo. 108, 222
S.W. 455 (1920).
47. State v. Huffman, 181 Neb. 356, 148 N.W.2d 321, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967);
Wright v. State, 420 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
48. United States v. White, 569 F.2d 263, 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978);
Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling of Real Evidence, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 527 (1983);
Imwinkelried, The Identification of Original, Real Evidence, 61 MIL. L. REv. 145, 158-62 (1973).
49. Imwinkelried, supra note 48, at 157 (quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa. 42, 50,
292 A.2d 352, 356 (1972)).
50. See generally Giannelli, supra note 23, at 688-95.
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unearthed indications of "a great degree of error."51 In the mid-1970s,
Dinovo and Gottschalk undertook to evaluate the proficiency of labora-
tories conducting drug analyses. They too reported significant variations
in the level of proficiency from laboratory to laboratory.52
Later in the same decade the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration funded a much larger test, the Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Program.53 Two hundred and forty laboratories participated. The re-
searchers sent the participating laboratories twenty-one sets of blind sam-
ples for analysis.54 On three of the twenty-one sets, fewer than half the
participating laboratories reported correct, complete findings.5 5 One of
the lead researchers reluctantly concluded that the tests demonstrated
that "a disturbingly high percentage of laboratories are not performing
routine tests competently .... ,56
In the early 1980s, other researchers administered a proficiency test to
105 toxicology laboratories in forty-nine states.57 Like the Laboratory
Proficiency Testing Program researchers, these researchers found the
laboratories' performance "disappointing."5 They discovered "consid-
erable" variation in proficiency, especially in quantitative analysis. 59 On
some samples, the coefficient of variation was 133 percent.10
In the mid-1980s, several organizations published proficiency studies
of laboratories conducting immunoassay tests to detect the presence of
contraband drugs in urine samples. The studies were conducted under
the auspices of such respected organizations as the College of American
Pathologists. Two researchers for the Office of Technology Assessment
of the United States Congress bluntly summarized the studies by genera-
51. Niyogi, Toxicology, in SCiENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 343, 383 (2d ed. 1981).
52. Dinovo & Gottschalk, Results of a Nine-Laboratory Survey of Forensic Toxicology Profi-
ciency, 22 CLq. CHEM. 843 (1976).
53. J. PETERSON, E. FABuiCAN-r & K. FIELD, supra note 30.
54. LEAA Newsletter, Sept. 1978, at 1, col. 1, at 5, col. 1.
55. Id. See also Garcia, Expert Witness Malpractice?, I Expert Evidence Rep. (Shep./McG.-
Hill) 267 (June 1990) ('3% of the laboratories had less than 50% of their responses considered
acceptable.").
56. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1984) (re-
marks of Professor Joseph Peterson), quoted in Giannelli, supra note 23, at 690.
57. Peat, Finnigan & Finkle, Proficiency Testing in Forensic Toxicology: A Feasibility Study, 28
J. FORENSIC SCI. 139, 141 (1983).
58. Id. at 139.
59. Id. at 157.
60. Id. at 156.
[Vol. 69:19
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lizing that "error rates continue to be high."6 1 A study conducted by the
Centers for Disease Control yielded particularly disturbing findings.62
One laboratory reported erroneous results on 66.5 percent of 160 samples
analyzed.63
In 1987, Collaborative Testing Services made public the results of a
proficiency test of laboratories engaged in electrophoretic analysis of en-
zymes and proteins.6" Sixty-eight laboratories participated in the test.
Sixteen of the laboratories (23.5%) erred on one or both samples.65
More recently, the Forensic Science Foundation released the results of
proficiency tests of document examiners.6 6 Like the studies described in
the preceding paragraphs, these tests disclosed an alarmingly high inci-
dence of misanalysis. The percentages of error were in the double
figures.67 The incidence of error was so high that it "should provide any-
one with cause for concern. '68
In sum, extensive hard evidence exists of a substantial margin of error
in modem forensic analysis. When an opposing party points to a brief
gap in chain of custody to challenge the trustworthiness of an item of
physical evidence, a court plausibly can dismiss the challenge as raising
only theoretical risks of error. However, when the challenge is directed
at a forensic laboratory analysis, the court cannot reject the challenge
summarily.
. Proof of The Use of Correct Protocol During the Specific Test in
Question as a Fundamental Guarantee of the Trustworthiness
of Scientific Evidence
The preceding subsection marshalled the empirical evidence demon-
strating that, as a general proposition, challenges to the trustworthiness
61. Miike & Hewitt, Accuracy and Reliability of Urine Drug Tests, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 641,
651-57 (1988).
62. Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of CDC Blind Study, 253 J.
A.M.A. 2382 (1985).
63. Id.
64. COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVICES, INC., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING
PROGRAM, PHYSIOLOGICAL FLUIDS ANALYSIS REPORT No. 87-2 (1987).
65. Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CAmF. L. REV.
665, 673 (1989).
66. See generally Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 738-51
(1989).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 749.
1991]
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of scientific testimony should not be treated as factors affecting only the
weight of the testimony. Studies simply present too much proof of a high
incidence of erroneous scientific analysis to treat scientific testimony in
the same fashion as a minor gap in a chain of custody for physical evi-
dence. The problem is identifying the specific facts that should condition
the admissibility of scientific testimony. It is submitted that the nature of
the particular error in question, namely, improper test protocol, calls the
accuracy of the test result into question in such a fundamental sense that
proof of that type of error ought to affect the admissibility and not
merely the weight of scientific testimony.
A factor should condition the admissibility of an item of evidence and
not merely affect the weight of the item when the factor directly relates
to the essential guarantee of the the evidence's trustworthiness. The
foundation for the business entry exception under the hearsay rule is il-
lustrative. The basic guarantee of the trustworthiness of business entries
is the business' motivation to maintain accurate records-documents on
the basis of which it pays its debts and bills its customers.6 9 That basic
guarantee accounts for many of the restrictions on the admissibility of
documents under the exception. The landmark case of Palmer v. Hoff-
man70 imposes one restriction: A document does not qualify under the
exception if the primary motivation for generating the document was to
prepare for trial.71 When preparation for litigation is the moving force
behind the creation of a document, the document lacks the basic guaran-
tee of trustworthiness. Johnson v. Lutz72 announced another restriction
on the scope of the doctrine: An entry does not fall within the exception
if the ultimate source of the information was not a part of the business
entity.73 Once again the basic guarantee is absent; the person who is the
real source of the information had no business duty to transmit accurate
information and consequently lacks the requisite motivation. These con-
siderations, the presence of a litigation motivation and the lack of a busi-
ness duty, condition the admissibility of the evidence precisely because
they both bear directly on the essential guarantee of the trustworthiness
of the evidence.
By parity of reasoning, the use of proper test protocol should condition
69. C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 304, 306, 308 (3d ed. 1984).
70. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
71. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 69, at § 308.
72. 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
73. C. McCORMICK, supra note 69, at § 310.
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the admissibility of scientific evidence. In the case of scientific evidence,
the essential guarantee of trustworthiness is that the forensic analyst em-
ploys a test which has been experimentally verified.7 4 The research scien-
tist initially formulates an hypothesis, for example, a theory about the
behavior of atoms or human beings." The researcher then designs and
conducts an experiment to validate or disprove the hypothesis.76 During
the experiment, the research scientist attempts to control all the relevant
variables 77 to minimize the risk that chance factors will influence the out-
come of the experiment.78 Assume that the experiment validates the hy-
pothesis79 by accounting for the results in the experiments. 0 In that
event, at a later point in time a forensic scientist can use the validated
theory to resolve factual questions in legal disputes.8" To do so, the fo-
rensic scientist controls for and replicates the conditions in the earlier
experiments. If the forensic scientist does so properly, the forensic test
should duplicate the results attained in the earlier experiments.
Once the process of validating a scientific hypothesis and putting the
validated hypothesis to forensic use is understood, it becomes clear that
the use of correct protocol during the forensic test directly relates to the
essential guarantee of the trustworthiness of scientific evidence. While
proof of the general validity of the hypothesis and a showing of correct
protocol are distinct factors affecting the trustworthiness of scientific evi-
dence, the factors are closely related. An essential objective of proper
forensic test procedure is replicating the conditions of the earlier experi-
ments.8 2 No matter how impressive the validity rates achieved in the
74. A. MOENSSENS, F. INnAU & J. STARRs, supra note 33, at § 1.03, at 7-8; E. SNYDER,
HISTORY OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 38 (1969); Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56
FORDHAM L. REv. 595, 621, 623-24 (1988).
75. Black, supra note 74, at 644; A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRs, supra note 33, at
§ 1.03, at 7.
76. A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 33; Black, supra note 74, at 621, 623-
24.
77. Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 566.
78. See generally Osterburg, The Scientific Method and Criminal Investigation, 9 J. POL. Sci. &
ADMIN. 135 (1981).
79. A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 33, at § 1.03, at 7.
80. Osterburg, supra note 78, at 136.
81. A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 33, at § 1.03, at 8.
82. Of course, proper test protocol entails more than merely duplicating the earlier experimen-
tal conditions. If the scientific technique in question is vulnerable to contamination, accepted proto-
col may include running a confirmatory test. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 38, at § 12-5(A). For
example, atomic absorption test procedures are susceptible to contamination. Krishnan, Detection of
Gunshot Residues on the Hands by Trace Element Analysis, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
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earlier research, the earlier experiments do not afford any assurance of
the trustworthiness of the result of the instant forensic test unless the
forensic scientist follows the correct procedure.
The importance of complying with sound protocol is obvious when the
scientific technique in .question is a complex, multi-step procedure such
as gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS)8 3 The more com-
plex the forensic test, the more critical it is that the forensic scientist
scrupulously comply with proper protocol. The more complex the test,
the greater is the number of variables that the forensic scientist must
attempt to control. However, even in the case of relatively simple foren-
sic techniques such as thin layer chromatography (TLC), it is vital that
the forensic scientist follow correct procedure. In a TLC test, the analyst
extracts a small portion of an unknown drug and places the extract on a
glass plate.84 The plate is coated with an adsorbent such as silica gel. 5
The analyst spots the unknown near the bottom of the plate. The plate is
then placed in a tank containing a solution. 6 The analyst places only the
lower edge of the plate in the solution. The solution creeps up the plate
by capillary action in much the same way as a liquid moves up a blot-
ter." After a predetermined period of time elapses, the analyst removes
the plate from the tank. The analyst then sprays the plate with a visual-
izing agent. After the spray, a streak of a particular length and color
appears on the plate."" The distance can be stated as an Rf value-the
ratio to front.8 9 In computing the Rf value the analyst compares the
distance traveled by the known solution (the front) and the distance trav-
eled by the unknown solution. For instance, if the unknown traveled half
315, 320 (2d ed. 1981). For that reason, many experienced AAS experts advise doing confirmatory
tests. Id.
Alternatively, when there is a large element of subjectivity in interpreting the test result, sound
protocol may include the use of positive controls or standards. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 38, at
§ 12-5(B). Some of the wet chemical color tests used for drug identification are somewhat subjective;
while one person might characterize a color as red, another might describe it as pink. To minimize
the element of subjectivity in test interpretation, the analyst will test a known drug at the same time
as the unknown. For instance, if the analyst suspects that the unknown is marijuana, she would test
a sample ofknown marijuana simultaneously. She could then compare the colors yielded by the two
tests. Bradford, Credibility of Drug Analysis Evidence, TRIAL 90 May/June 1975, at 90.
83. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE § 23-3(C), at 985-99 (1986).
84. Id. at § 23-2(D), at 940.
85. Id. at § 23-2(D), at 940-41.
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as far as the solution, the Rf value would be .50. By consulting a
database of Rf values, the analyst can identify the unknown as, for exam-
ple, cocaine.
Suppose that the research scientist who generated the database of Rf
values allowed the unknown to migrate up the plate for thirty minutes.
Permitting the unknown to migrate for only thirty minutes would be an
element of proper scientific protocol for conducting that type of TLC
test. If the forensic scientist who tested the unknown in the pending law-
suit allowed the unknown to migrate for thirty-five minutes, the forensic
scientist's conclusion that the unknown was cocaine would be untrust-
worthy. The time lapse variable determines the length of the unknown's
migration up the plate, and the forensic scientist relies on the length of
the migration in identifying the unknown drug. The forensic scientist
neglected to replicate the conditions of the earlier experiments; a devia-
tion from correct test procedure in that respect renders the earlier
database worthless as an aid in identifying this unknown.
Or suppose that while the research scientist employed one chemical
solution in the tank, the forensic scientist used a different solution. "Rf
values are valid only for particular sets of conditions, namely, particular
combinations of adsorbent and solvent front." 9 Once again, by care-
lessly using another solution, the forensic scientist has failed to reproduce
the conditions that existed during the earlier experiments. Hence, the
forensic scientist has no right to rely on the Rf values in the earlier
database. The deviation from proper protocol renders the forensic scien-
tist's opinion at best untrustworthy.
The same point can be illustrated with a scientific procedure of inter-
mediate complexity such as gas chromatography (GO). In this proce-
dure, the forensic scientist reduces the unknown to gaseous form and
then sends the unknown through a specially coated column.91 The un-
known is heated to a certain temperature before insertion in the column,
and a gas carries the unknown through the column. Different drugs mi-
grate through the column at different retention times or speeds. Like the
Rf value in a TLC test, the retention time in a GC test is an important
clue to the identity of the unknown. However, before comparing the re-
tention time in a given test with a published database of retention times
achieved in earlier experiments, the forensic scientist must ensure that
90. Id. at § 23-2(D), at 944.
91. Id. at § 23-2(D), at 945.
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she controls for the variables in the earlier experiments. If the unknown
was heated to a different temperature, if the column was coated with
different material, or if the forensic scientist had used a different carrier
gas, it would be improper to use the earlier database to interpret the
retention time which the GC procedure yielded in the instant test.92 No
matter how well-designed the earlier experiments validating the GC pro-
cedure, the forensic scientist cannot rely on that experimental data unless
she follows correct test protocol by replicating the conditions of the pre-
ceding experiments.
The empirical studies of laboratory proficiency confirm the importance
of proper test protocol. After identifying accurate test results by the par-
ticipating laboratories, the Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program fol-
lowed up on inaccurate test results and attempted to identify the causes
of the inaccuracies. The final report on the program repeatedly lists the
analyst's use of improper test procedure as a contributing cause of inac-
curate test results.9 3 Indeed, the report lists that factor more frequently
than any other cause. In its studies of the proficiency of drug testing
laboratories, the Centers for Disease Control has likewise pointed to un-
sound test protocol as a cause for erroneous test results.94
Admittedly, only a minority of published DNA cases explicitly hold
that the factor of proper test procedure affects the admissibility of DNA
evidence. 95 Those cases offer little policy justification for elevating proof
of correct test procedure to the status of a condition to admissibility.
Nevertheless, those cases represent the better view and come to the right
result. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly observed in Schwartz
that "specific DNA test results are only as reliable and accurate as the
testing procedures used by the particular laboratory." 96 As scientific evi-
dence, a DNA test by a forensic scientist derives its trustworthiness from
the earlier research experiments validating the hypothesis that the test
accurately analyzes a person's DNA. Those experiments, however, af-
92. Id. at § 23-2(D), at 950.
93. J. PETEsoN, E. FABRICANT & K. FIELD, supra note 30, at 203-06, 223, 230, 239, 258.
94. See generally Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of CDC Blind
Study, 253 J. A.M.A. 2382 (1985); Jain, Sneath & Budd, Blind Proficiency Testing In Urine Drug
Screening: The Need for an Effective Quality Control Program, 1 J. ANAL. ToxICOL. 142 (1977);
Mason, Some Realities and Results of Proficiency Testing of Laboratories Performing Toxicological
Analyses, 5 J. ANAL. TOXICOL. 201 (1981); Shoemaker, Klein & Sideman, Drug Abuse Proficiency
Testing in Pennsylvania 1972-1976, 1 J. ANAL. ToxiCOL. 130 (1977).
95. Harmon, supra note 7, at 150-51. See also United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.
1990).
96. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989).
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ford no assurance of the trustworthiness of the forensic test offered at
trial unless the forensic scientist replicated the conditions in effect during
the earlier experiments. A sine qua non for correct protocol is duplicat-
ing all the controlled variables in the earlier experiments. Just as the
considerations of a lack of a business duty or the presence of a litigation
motivation are highly germane to the essential guarantee of the trustwor-
thiness of business entries, sound test procedure relates directly to the
trustworthiness of scientific evidence. Palmer v. Hoffman 97 and Johnson
v. Lutz9 8 properly concluded that the factors at work in those cases
should impact the admissibility of the proffered business entries and not
merely weight. A fortiori, Schwartz correctly concluded that a deviation
from proper test protocol can render scientific evidence inadmissible.
II. IF DEFICIENCIES IN TEST PROCEDURE SHOULD AFFECT THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, WHO SHOULD
HAVE THE BURDEN ON THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER THE FORENSIC ANALYST
FOLLOWED CORRECT PROCEDURE?
Section I demonstrated that the factor of correct test protocol should
affect the admissibility as well as the weight of scientific evidence. At this
juncture, the temptation is to leap to the conclusion that the proponent
of scientific evidence must therefore make an affirmative, foundational
showing that on the occasion in question, the forensic analyst followed
correct protocol. To use the terminology of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, proof of proper test procedure would be a "preliminary" or foun-
dational fact conditioning the admissibility of scientific evidence.99 The
proponent of evidence ordinarily has the burden of persuading the trial
judge that the preliminary fact exists." 0 The proponent must establish
the fact by a preponderance of the evidence.101 For example, to bring a
hearsay statement within the excited utterance exception,102 the propo-
nent of the statement must show that the declarant made the statement
spontaneously in a state of nervous excitement. 103 If we applied the nor-
97. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
98. 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
99. FED. R. EVID. 104.
100. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF Evi-
DENCE 110-15 (2d ed. 1986).
101. Boujaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987).
102. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
103. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 100, at 113.
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mal practice to the factor of proper test procedure, we would assign the
proponent the burden of proving that the forensic scientist followed cor-
rect protocol in conducting the test in question-the conclusion reached
by the Castro 104 and Schwartz 105 courts.
However, this Section proposes that the normal practice should not be
applied to the issue of compliance with sound scientific protocol. This
section contends that while Castro and Schwartz correctly treat the ques-
tion of compliance with proper test procedure as a factor affecting admis-
sibility, they err in allocating the burden on the issue to the proponent.
Initially, this section argues that as a matter of policy, it is neither neces-
sary nor desirable to assign the burden to the proponent. Concededly,
the argument advanced in this section is a novel one; to date, no court
has held that the party opposing the admission of scientific evidence
should bear the burden of showing noncompliance with correct test pro-
cedure. However, allocating the burden on a preliminary fact to the op-
ponent is not unprecedented. As we shall see later in this section, in
another context the Federal Rules of Evidence assign the burden on a
preliminary fact to the opponent. 10 6 This section argues that the burden
of showing compliance with correct test procedure is analogous to that
context. Thus, the soundest solution is to treat the compliance issue as a
factor affecting admissibility, but shift the burden to the opponent.
A. In Principle, Allocating the Burden on the Issue of Proper Test
Protocol to the Opponent of Scientific Evidence Is Sound.
1. Substantively, allocating the burden to the proponent is neither
necessary nor desirable.
Section I canvassed the empirical studies establishing a significant
margin of error in modem forensic analysis. However, those studies do
not dictate the conclusion that it is necessary to assign the proponent of
scientific evidence the burden on the issue of correct test protocol.
In determining the allocation of a burden, the court should consider
several factors. 7 In the vast majority of cases, the most "significant
consideration [guiding the court's decision] is the judicial estimate of the
probabilities of the situation. The risk of failure of proof [should] be
104. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
105. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426-28 (Minn. 1989).
106. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
107. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 69, at § 337.
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placed upon the party who contends that the more unusual event has
occurred." 10' 8 Courts usually assign the burden to the party whose "con-
tention departs from what would be expected in the light of ordinary
human experience." ' °9
This factor cuts in favor of allocating the burden on the issue of test
protocol to the party opposing the admission of scientific evidence.
Although the available proficiency studies demonstrate the existence of a
significant margin of error in forensic testing, we must not overstate the
findings of those studies. As a leading critic of the indiscriminate admis-
sion of scientific testimony concedes, "The point is not that most labora-
tory test results are erroneous .... Indeed, the opposite is true." 110 The
results of the Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program"' are often cited
as proof that a "significant""' 2 margin of error in laboratory analyses
exists. Yet those very results demonstrate that most laboratory tests are
properly conducted and trustworthy. On most of the twenty-one sets of
samples, the overwhelming majority of laboratories accurately analyzed
the samples. 13 For many sets, the accuracy rate was well into the ninety
percent range.1 14
The documented margin of error in laboratory analysis is too substan-
tial to dismiss it lightly as a factor that should affect only the weight of
scientific testimony. However, when a party offers evidence based on a
forensic test at trial, it is highly probable that the test was properly con-
ducted and the evidence trustworthy.' 15 If the probabilities favored the
conclusion that the test had been improperly conducted, it would argua-
bly be necessary to assign the proponent the burden; the assignment
would serve as a means of shielding the trier of fact from untrustworthy
108. Id. at § 337, at 950.
109. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.8, at 252 (2d ed. 1977).
110. Giannelli, supra note 23, at 692.
111. Id. at 688-90.
112. Id. at 692.
113. Id. at 689 n.155.
114. Id. (test sample #1-92.2%, test sample #3-96.2%, test sample #4-95.2%, test sam-
ple #6-98.3%, test sample #7-94.7%, test sample #12-98.3%, test sample #13(A)-97.7%,
test sample # 13(B)-98.4%, and test sample #20(A) -94.6%).
115. Assume an extreme fact situation: In the case of a particular "scientific" technique, it is
demonstrable that incorrect protocol is so widespread that the test was probably conducted improp-
erly. On that assumption, at the very least the court would be justified in allocating the burden to
the proponent. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the admission of expert testimony only when
the testimony will "assist the trier of fact .... FED. R. EVID. 702. If the technique in question
suffers from such an extensive problem of improper test protocol, it is doubtful whether the admis-
sion of the testimony would assist the trier.
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test results. However, "the opposite is true."'1 16 The probability favors
the forensic analyst's compliance with sound protocol, and it is conse-
quently unnecessary to allocate the proponent the burden. The analyst
ordinarily follows correct procedure, and it is therefore appropriate to
assign the opponent the burden of showing something extraordinary
about the instant test.
It is also undesirable to allocate the burden to the proponent. One of
the constant complaints about the use of scientific evidence is that its
presentation at trial can be extremely time-consuming. The horror sto-
ries about scientific testimony abound. In one case, the opposing party
objected to the admission of an electrophoretic analysis of dried blood-
stains. 1 7 The testimony about the trustworthiness of electrophoresis re-
quired eight days of court time.118 In another case, scientific testimony
about the trustworthiness of a moving radar speedmeter consumed "over
2,000 pages" of transcript." 9 In the Castro case, the parties presented
"approximately five thousand pages" of testimony and argument over the
trustworthiness of the DNA evidence, notably the specific manner in
which the laboratory technicians had applied DNA typing technology in
that case. 120 The presentation of this testimony and argument required
twelve weeks of court time.'2 '
Assigning the proponent the burden on the issue of correct test proto-
col lengthens the foundation the proponent must lay and increases the
amount of court time needed to present scientific evidence. If the
probability favored the assumption that the evidence was flawed, the ex-
penditure of additional court time might be warranted. However, the
probability favors the contrary assumption. A cost/benefit analysis
therefore suggests that in the typical case the consumption of additional
court time is unwarranted. In most metropolitan areas, court calendars
are already backlogged. 22 Court time is a precious commodity. In the
116. Giannelli, supra note 23, at 692.
117. People v. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1987).
118. 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1135, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
119. State v. Aquilera, 25 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) (Fla. Cir. Ct.) 2189 (May 7, 1979).
120. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
121. Note, supra note 19, at 691.
122. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM1TrEE, 5-6 (1990); R. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURS: CRISIS AND REFORm 64 (1985); Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future
Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (Oct.-Nov. 1987); Marvell, Are Caseloads Really Increasing? Yes, 25
THE JUDGES' J. 35 (Sum. 1986); Marvel, Civil Caseloads: The Impact of the Economy and Trial
Judgeship Increases, 69 JUDICATURE 153 (Oct.-Nov. 1985); The Drugging of the Courts: How Sick
Is the Patient, and What Is the Treatment?, 73 JUDICATURE 314 (Apr.-May 1990).
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normal case, requiring the proponent to make an affirmative showing
that the forensic analyst complied with proper scientific protocol in con-
ducting the test wastes that commodity.
2. Procedurally, allocating the burden to the opponent is fair when
the opponent has an adequate opportunity for pretrial
discovery.
The judicial estimate of the probabilities is not the only consideration
pertinent to the allocation of the burden.12 Another consideration is the
parties' relative access to the relevant information.1 24 If one party has
readier access to the information, it may be fairer in a procedural sense to
allocate that party the burden; it is easier for that party to gather and
present the evidence relevant to the factual issue.
This consideration is particularly important when allocating burdens
on issues related to scientific evidence:
[Miany attorneys lack the scientific background necessary to evaluate the
[scientific] evidence at first glance [at trial]. If the [proponent's] scientific
analyses remain undisclosed until trial, most [opposing] attorneys would be
unable to detect any errors in the [scientific] report. The opposing attorney
needs a pretrial opportunity to study the report and to learn enough about
the relevant scientific discipline to critique the report. 125
Unfortunately, some jurisdictions limit pretrial discovery of scientific evi-
dence, particularly in criminal ases. 126 Before trial, the opposing attor-
ney may receive a scientific report stating only the analyst's ultimate
findings.'27 The opponent may be unable to force the analyst to disclose
the particular tests she used to reach the findings' 2 -much less the spe-
cific procedures the analyst employed in conducting the test. In jurisdic-
tions granting such paltry discovery, the proponent should probably have
the burden at trial on the issue of correct test protocol. Fortunately, in
other jurisdictions, pretrial discovery of scientific evidence is more am-
ple. 129 In several of the DNA cases, the courts have been insistent that
the defense be accorded "extensive" pretrial discovery of the prosecu-
123. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 69, at § 337.
124. Id. at § 337, at 950.
125. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of AlL" No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution's
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 247, 258-59 (1987).
126. See generally P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRiED, supra note 83, at Ch. 3.
127. Giannelli, supra note 23, at 692.
128. Id. at 692-93.
129. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 83.
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tion's DNA testing evidence. 130 Federal13 ' and state132 courts alike have
recognized the defense's entitlement to ample discovery in DNA cases.
The Castro 133 and Schwartz 134 cases illustrate the type of effective,
successful attack on test protocol that an opposing attorney can mount
when she is afforded adequate pretrial discovery. In many of the prior
DNA cases, the defense counsel had not called any witnesses to rebut the
prosecution expert's testimony. 35 In contrast, the defense attorneys in
Castro and Schwartz presented expert testimony that acutely critiqued
the manner in which the prosecution experts had conducted their DNA
tests. 136 As these cases demonstrate, adequate pretrial discovery is the
essential tool which the opponent needs to unmask untrustworthy foren-
sic analyses at trial. So long as the opponent is granted adequate discov-
ery in a practical as well as a formal sense, 137 assigning the opponent the
130. Jonakait, supra note 11, at 123. See also Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Wit-
ness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CALIF. L. Rav. 665, 678 (1989); The Fairy Tale is Over: DNA Enters the
Very Adversarial World of the Law, 13 Sci. SLEUTHING REV. 10, 10-11 (Fall 1989) (describing the
discovery granted in the Kiles case in Arizona).
131. United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
132. State v. Schwartz, 447 S.W.2d 422, 427-28 (Minn. 1989). See also Debbs v. Vergar, 59
U.S.L.W. 2418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 29, 1990) (post-conviction discovery); The Fairy Tale is Over:
DNA Enters the Very Adversarial World of the Law, 13 SCl. SLEUTHING REv. 10, 11 (Fall 1989) (in
the Kiles case, in Yuma Arizona, the "trial court judge granted the defense's discovery requests in its
substantial particulars .... [Defense] discovery requests are being made for box-car loads of DNA
items from the testing agency, and [c]ourt orders are being entered requiring compliance with sub-
stantial parts of these requests. The F.B.I., for its part, is routinely acquiescing in these orders").
133. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
134. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
135. Jonakait, supra note 11, at 122-23; Lewin, DNA Typing on the Witness Stand, 244 SCIENCE
1033 (June 1, 1989).
136. Jonakait, supra note 11, at 123-24.
137. Suppose that the proponent's expert has maintained such poor records of the forensic test
that it is impossible for the opponent to reconstruct the manner in which the test was conducted. On
the one hand, even when this situation arises in a criminal context, it is probably constitutional to
admit the evidence against an accused. In Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985), the State's
expert subjected a hair strand to forensic analysis. At the time of trial, the expert testified to his
finding that the strand had been forcibly removed. However, the expert conceded that he could not
recall which scientific techniques he had used to reach that finding. The defense argued that the
admission of the expert's testimony ran afoul of the confrontation clause. In a per curiam opinion,
the Court rejected the argument. Fensterer is a more extreme case than our hypothetical; in Fen.
sterer, the expert could not identify the scientific techniques he had employed-much less describe
the manner in which he had applied those techniques.
On the other hand, as a matter of evidentiary policy, in this situation it seems preferable to shift
the burden to the witness' proponent. It is true that in a formal sense, the opponent has been ac-
corded discovery. However, in a practical sense, the opponent has been denied discovery; the ex-
pert's poor documentation makes it impossible for the opponent affirmatively to show that there has
been a material deviation from sound test protocol. Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unrella-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/5
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burden on the issue of correct test protocol is not unfair.
B. In the Analogous Setting of the Official Record Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) Allocates
the Opposing Party the Burden on the Issue of Whether
"the Sources of Information or Other Circumstances
Indicate Lack of Trustworthiness. "
At the beginning of Section II, we noted the normal practice of as-
signing the proponent of evidence the burden on all factors conditioning
the admissibility of the evidence. Interestingly enough, the drafters of
the Federal Rules of Evidence abandoned the orthodox practice 138 in
Rule 803(8)(C). In pertinent part, the rule reads:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness: (8) Public records and reports. Records, re-
ports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or
agencies, setting forth... (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an inves-
tigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
ble Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv. 465, 492-93 (1990). Ex
hypothesis, the expert in question is the proponent's witness; the witness is either an employee of the
proponent or a hired consultant. Because the proponent has selected the expert, it seems fairer to
allocate the risk of the expert's shoddy documentation to the proponent. A similar risk allocation
underlies the well-settled "missing witness" doctrine. If the posture of the case indicates that a
particular person is likely to have relevant knowledge but a party fails to call the person as a witness,
the opposition may invite the jury to draw an adverse inference from the failure when the party has a
special relationship with the person. R. KLONOFF & P. COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDEN-
TIARY TACTICS FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS 124-26 (1990). The doctrine applies to the employer-
employee relationship. Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 659 n.5 (1lth Cir. 1988).
138. The Federal Rules allocate burdens to the opponent in several other instances as well. For
example, under Federal Rule 403, the opponent has the burden of persuading the court that the
probative dangers incident to the admission of an item of evidence outweigh the probative value of
the item. See Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the
Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1465, 1474-79 (1985).
Morever, the opponent also has a burden under the Federal Rules version of the best evidence
rule. Under Federal Rule 1003, a duplicate is generally as admissible as an original. FED. R. EViD.
1003. However, the statute recognizes two exceptions to that general rule: when "(1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair
to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original." Ia The opponent has the burden on these exceptions.
E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL Evi-
DENCE § 1506, at 46 (Supp. 1989); People v. Atkins, 210 Cal. App. 3d 47, 55, 258 Cal. Rptr. 113,
118 (1989) ("Under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, which is identical to [California] Evidence Code
section 1511, the burden is on the opponent to raise a genuine issue as to the authenticity of the
original or to show that under the circumstances it would be unfair to use the duplicate in lieu of the
original").
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information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 139
In construing Rule 803(8)(C), the courts have in effect divided the rule
into two parts. The first part begins with "[r]ecords, reports, statements,
or data compilations" and ends with "authority granted by law." That
part prescribes the preliminary or foundational facts on which the propo-
nent of the evidence has the burden. If the proponent establishes those
facts, a "factual finding" in an official record is presumptively admissi-
ble.1" The Supreme Court has construed the expression "factual find-
ing" broadly as including opinionated findings about events which the
government official did not witness. In its 1988 decision, Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Rainey, 4 ' the Court held that the statutory expression included
an opinion by a Naval investigator that the most probable cause of an
airplane accident was pilot error. 42
The second part of the rule begins with "unless" and runs to the end of
the rule. This part serves as a "provision for escape" for the party oppos-
ing the admission of the official record."43 Like the first part of the rule,
this part sets out factors conditioning the admissibility of official
records;"4 but under the second part of the rule, the opponent has the
burden. 45 The drafters' use of a separate clause, beginning with "un-
less," manifests their intent to shift the burden to the opponent. Thus, to
exclude evidence under the second part of the rule, the opponent must
come forward with evidence 46 affirmatively showing that the official rec-
ord in question is untrustworthy. 47
139. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
140. SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1255-56 (D.D.C. 1975).
141. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
142. Dean McCormick has urged the courts to admit opinionated findings in reports of investi-
gation prepared by impartial, expert government officials. McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider
Use of Reports of Official Investigations?, 42 IowA L. REV. 363 (1957). The advisory committce
approvingly cited Dean McCormick's article in its note to Rule 803(8)(C). FED. R. EviD. 803(8)
advisory committee's note.
143. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 1537 (1988).
144. The Supreme Court has distinguished an invocation of the "provision for escape" from a
mere attack on the weight of the evidence. Id. at 167-68.
145. D. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 10.04, at 109 (2d ed. Supp. 1989); M. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.8, at 880-81 (2d ed. 1986) (citing Ellis v. International
Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984)); 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 456, at 766 (1980); G. WEMSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.46, at 439 (1987); Haddad,
The Future of Confrontation Clause Developments: What Will Emerge When the Supreme Court
Synthesizes the Diverse Lines of Confrontation Decisions?, 81 J. CRIM. LAw & CRIMINOLOOY 77, 85
(1990).
146. Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1315-16 (3d Cir. 1978).
147. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.8, at 241 (2d ed. Supp. 1990)
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The allocation of the burden to the opponent on a factor conditioning
admissibility under the second part of Rule 803(8)(C) is novel. However,
the rule is justifiable.
The opponent is entitled to more than a mere opportunity to attack the
weight of the official record. 4 ' Rule 803(8)(C) dramatically expands the
official record exception to encompass opinionated findings about events
even when the government investigator lacks personal knowledge of the
event. 149 At common law, the conventional view is that the exception is
confined to factual statements resting on a government official's firsthand
knowledge. 50 By expanding the exception in this fashion, Rule
803(8)(C) heightens the risk of the admission of untrustworthy evi-
dence;'"I the rule allows the investigator to draw inferences from under-
lying facts, and the inferential step creates another potential source of
error. The investigator is doing far more than relating factual observa-
tions; the investigator is also drawing conclusions from those observa-
tions. The limitations on lay and expert opinion testimony 152 exist
because conclusions are frequently erroneous. The risk is significant
enough to accord the opponent an opportunity to challenge the admissi-
bility of these opinionated findings.
Yet the risk hardly approaches a probability that the factual finding is
untrustworthy. As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ex-
plained in a case involving Centers for Disease Control epidemiological
studies, "Placing the burden on the opposing party makes considerable
practical sense. Most government sponsored investigations employ well
accepted methodological means of gathering and analyzing data." '153
The finding in an otherwise admissible official record is probably reliable,
and that probability justifies a rebuttable presumption that the finding is
admissible. " Citing the advisory committee note to Rule 803, the Beech
Aircraft Corporation Court stated that the opportunity to rebut the pre-
(citing Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.
1986)).
148. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 167-68.
149. Id.
150. McCormick, supra note 142.
151. See generally Note, The Trustworthiness of Government Evaluative Reports Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), 96 HARV. L. REv. 492 (1982); Comment, The Admissibility of Evalua-
tive Reports Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), 68 KY. L.J. 197 (1979-80).
152. FED. R. EVID. 701-06.
153. Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984); D. BINDER, HEAR-
SAY HANDBOOK § 10.04, at 109 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
154. SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1255-56 (D.D.C. 1975).
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sumption affords the opponent "ample" protection.155
A powerful analogy exists between Rule 803(8)(C) and the approach
to the admissibility of scientific evidence proposed in this article. Under
the second part of Rule 803(8)(C), the opposing party can block the in-
troduction of an otherwise admissible finding by showing "[particular]
sources of information or other [specific] circumstances" surrounding the
preparation of the report "indicatfing] lack of trustworthiness."1" 6
Under the proposal advanced in this article, the party opposing the ad-
mission of testimony about a scientific test can prevent the admission of
testimony based on a validated scientific technique by demonstrating that
the forensic analyst deviated from sound protocol in conducting the test.
In both instances, there is a significant risk of untrustworthiness-in the
former case, arising from the investigator's inference from the underlying
data, and in the latter case, caused by the forensic analyst's failure to
replicate the essential conditions obtaining during the earlier experi-
ments. In neither setting can the risk be dismissed as remote or fanciful.
However, the parallel continues because in both instances, the risk of
error falls short of a likelihood that the evidence is untrustworthy.
The case law construing Rule 803(8)(C) bears out the analogy between
the rule and the proposal in this Article. In some cases, the courts have
applied the rule to permit the admission of scientific reports. As previ-
ously stated, the Fourth Circuit has applied Rule 803(8)(C) to epidemio-
logical studies by the Centers for Disease Control (C.D.C.)1 57 The court
emphasized that "[m]ost government sponsored investigations employ
well accepted methodological means of gathering and analyzing data."15 8
For that reason, the court, in effect, indulged in the presumption that the
C.D.C. analysts who had conducted the studies in question had followed
proper methodology in preparing those studies.
In other cases involving scientific reports proffered under Rule
803(8)(C), the opponent succeeded in making an affirmative showing that
the forensic experts who prepared the reports deviated from sound proto-
col. For example, in an antitrust case, a party opposed the admission of
a New Zealand task force finding on the chiropractic profession in that
155. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 at 167.
156. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
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country. 159 The opponent pointed out that the Office of Technology As-
sessment of the United States Congress had concluded that the New Zea-
land report was "not based upon well-designed, controlled clinical
trials." 1" Consequently, the district court excluded the finding.
Allocating the burden to the opponent under Rule 803(8)(C) has
proved to be workable. It is true that Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey 161
presented the Supreme Court solely with a question of statutory con-
struction; the Court was not called upon to formulate a common law
rule governing the admissibility of evaluative findings in official records.
However, the tenor of the opinion makes it evident that the majority
believes that the compromise struck in Rule 803(8)(C) is both manage-
able and fair. When the source of the information for an official record
or the peculiar circumstances surrounding the preparation of the report
raise grave doubts about the trustworthiness of the report, Rule
803(8)(C) permits the opponent to mount admissibility as well as weight
attacks on the report. 162 While the opponent has the burden to establish
the facts about the source or other circumstances giving rise to such sub-
stantial doubts, the opponent has "ample" protection. 163 The existence
of such facts is improbable; but when the improbable comes to pass, the
opponent, assured of ample pretrial discovery, has a fair opportunity to
prove that the improbable has occurred. This policy analysis persuaded
both the advisory committee and the Supreme Court of the wisdom of
Rule 803(8)(C). Identical reasoning supports the allocation of the bur-
den to the opponent on the issue of the use of correct scientific test
procedure.
III. CONCLUSION
The central focus of the publicity for the DNA cases has been the
general trustworthiness of the DNA typing technology. 16" However, as
we have seen, the DNA cases pose broader issues, which in the long term
may prove to be even more important.
One issue posed by the DNA cases is who should bear the burden on
159. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1471-73 (D.N.E. IM. 1987), aff'd, 895
F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2621 (1990).
160. Id. at 1472.
161. 488 U.S. 153 (1989).
162. Id. at 167-68.
163. Id. at 167.
164. P. GJANNELLI & E. IMWRIELRIMD, supra note 4, at § 17-8.
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the issue of correct scientific protocol. This Article proposes that the
opponent shoulder the burden. Assuming that the opponent has ade-
quate opportunity for pretrial discovery, 6 ' the allocation is procedurally
fair. Castro and Schwartz exemplify the type of discerning, effective at-
tack that the opponent can mount. The allocation is substantively sensi-
ble, since even the proficiency studies cited by the critics of scientific
evidence demonstrate that in most instances forensic tests are properly
conducted and trustworthy. The allocation is certainly desirable from a
systemic perspective; shifting the burden to the opponent is likely to re-
sult in a net savings of trial time for an overtaxed system.
It would be a mistake to overstate the effect of implementing this pro-
posal. In the short term, the time savings may be quite small. In many
cases, to ensure that her evidence is comprehensible to the trier of fact,
the proponent will still elicit some testimony about the manner in which
the forensic analyst applied the scientific technique in the instant case.166
However, in the long term, this proposal can have a significant impact.
As the Supreme Court's decision in Beech Aircraft 167 suggests, Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) has worked reasonably well despite its novel
allocation of a burden to the opponent. To date, the experiment with the
reallocation technique in Rule 803(8)(C) has been successful. The next
165. The proposed allocation shares the same assumption as Federal Rule of Evidence 705,
That rule provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without
prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
examination.
The advisory committee defended Rule 705 in this fashion:
If the objection is made that leaving it to the cross-examiner to bring out the supporting
data is essentially unfair, the answer is that he is under no compulsion to bring out any
facts or data except those unfavorable to the opinion. The answer assumes that the cross-
examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for effective cross-examination.
This advance knowledge has been afforded, though imperfectly, by the traditional founda-
tion requirement. Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as revised, provides for
substantial discovery in this area, obviating in large measure the obstacles which have been
raised in some instances to discovery of findings, underlying data, and even the identity of
the experts.
FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's note.
166. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific Evidence, in SCIEN-
TYPIC AND EXPERT EvIDENCE 33, 52-57, 66-67 (2d ed. 1981). The proponent is likely to devote a
substantial amount of time to this foundational element when the ultimate expert opinion is a minute
measurement. Neutron activation analysis is a sensitive technique, capable of precisely measuring
small quantities of chemical elements. Watkins & Watkins, Identification of Substances by Neutron
Activation Analysis, 15 AM. JUR. P.O.F. 115, 123-25 (1964).
167. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1989).
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logical step would be to extend the technique of shifting the burden to
the opponent on issues such as the question of correct test protocol. As
in the case of Rule 803(8)(C), the opponent is urging the improbable
position; and laying the foundation for scientific testimony can be so ex-
ceptionally time-consuming that any saving of trial time would be help-
ful. In the past, courts have mechanically assumed that the proponent
should have the burden on any factor impacting the admissibility of evi-
dence. That assumption is not inexorable. Court calendars are now
greatly backlogged in many jurisdictions. 68 This may be the right time
to explore the use of reallocation of burdens to the opponent in the inter-
est of judicial economy. The reallocation of burdens may ultimately
prove to be an effective method of streamlining evidentiary foundations.
Reallocating the burden to the opponent on the issue of correct scientific
protocol would generate additional experience with this potentially
promising technique.
The other issue raised by the DNA cases is the question of whether
deficiencies in test procedure should affect the admissibility or merely the
weight of scientific evidence. 69 While respectable authority for the prop-
osition that test deficiencies affect only the weight of the evidence per-
sists,1 70 the Castro 171 and Schwartz1 72 courts embraced the sounder,
contrary view. Professor Melvin Lewis put the matter colorfully when
he wrote that "[i]t is no more correct to say that neutron activation anal-
ysis detects the presence of barium and antimony than to say that a violin
produces music. 1 73
As powerful as a scientific technique such as neutron activation analy-
sis or DNA typing may be, in the forensic world the technique must be
applied by a fallible human being. The process of hypothesis formulation
and experimental verification can yield highly trustworthy scientific tech-
niques.174 A well-designed experiment based on an extensive database
supplies substantial assurance that the technique itself is trustworthy
enough to serve as a basis for trial testimony. However, the earlier exper-
iments furnish no assurance of the reliability of the specific forensic test
168. See supra authorities collected in note 122.
169. Harmon, supra note 7, at 150-51.
170. Id.
171. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
172. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426-28 (Minn. 1989). See also United States v. Two
Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
173. Lewis, supra note 1, at 430.
174. Black, supra note 74, at 621, 623-24.
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proffered in court unless the forensic analyst replicated the conditions
that the research scientist controlled for in the preceding experiments.
An essential goal of correct forensic test protocol is duplicating the ear-
lier conditions. Proper protocol is therefore directly related to the essen-
tial guarantee of the trustworthiness of scientific evidence. In principle,
that factor should condition the admissibility of scientific testimony and
not merely its weight. Courts should follow the lead of Castro and
Schwartz, extrapolate from those cases, and treat deviations from correct
test protocol as a factor affecting the admissibility of all types of scientific
evidence.
Once again, it would be exaggerated to predict that the adoption of
this view will have a dramatic, immediate effect. The adoption of this
view will likely change the ruling on the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence in only a small number of cases. 1"1 Common sense will lead courts
to the conclusion that they should not automatically exclude scientific
testimony whenever the forensic analyst deviates from correct test proto-
col in any minor respect. Like the investigator preparing an official re-
port offered under Rule 803(8)(C), the analyst need not dot every i and
cross every t. In most cases, to bar the admission of the evidence, the
opponent will have to present persuasive expert testimony that the ana-
lyst deviated from accepted protocol and that the specific deviation could
materially affect the test outcome. Judging on the basis of the published
opinions,1" the opponent will be able to make that showing in only a
small percentage of cases.
However, like the allocation of the burden on test protocol to the op-
ponent, the adoption of this view can have an important impact in the
long term. To some extent the adoption of this view will refocus the
attention of the judicial system. In the past, courts and commentators
have concentrated on the general reliability of the scientific theory or
technique. The battleground has been whether courts should continue to
enforce the Frye test, requiring that the technique be generally accepted
within the relevant scientific circle.77
175. Although the opponent's evidence is always admissible "to impeach the particular proce-
dures employed in a specific test," the evidence will render the test inadmissible only "[i]n extreme
cases." State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 260 (W.Va. 1989).
176. Id.
177. See Bretz, Scientific Evidence and the Frye Rule: The Case for a Cautious Approach, 4
COOLEY L. REv. 506 (1987); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Hal/-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 1197 (1980); Starrs, A Still Life Water-
color: Frye v. United States, 27 3. FORENsic Sc. 684 (1982); Note, United States v. Downin&7
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In part because of the concentration on general reliability, courts and
commentators have largely overlooked the importance of the forensic an-
alyst's compliance with proper scientific protocol in conducting the spe-
cific test proffered at trial.178 However, as the published proficiency
studies demonstrate, unsound test procedure may be the leading cause of
laboratory misanalysis. 179 The problem of improper test protocol de-
serves closer scrutiny by the courts. Treating test procedure as a factor
conditioning admissibility will not only redirect the courts' attention; it
will also send an important signal to forensic analysts. The signal is that
in court, their test protocols can be closely scrutinized and that in appro-
priate cases, their testimony will be excluded altogether if they deviate
from sound test procedure. As Professor Lewis has reminded us, since
we must rely on human beings to apply scientific techniques such as
DNA typing, human error in forensic analysis is an inevitable possibil-
ity.18 However, by elevating test protocol to the status of a factor affect-
ing admissibility and not merely weight, evidence law can give forensic
analysts an added incentive to adhere scrupulously to sound test proce-
dures. In the long term, evidence law can affect the development of fo-
rensic science. 11 We must have faith that what attorneys and judges do
in the courtroom can impact what scientists do in the laboratory.182
Novel Scientific Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 839. See P. GIANNELLI &
E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 83, at §§ 1, 5, 6 (collecting cases); A. MoENSsENs, F. INBAU & J.
STARRS, supra note 33, at § 1.03 (collecting cases).
178, Harmon, supra note 7, at 150-51.
179. J. PETERSON, E. FABRiCANT & K. FIELD, supra note 30, at 203-06, 223, 230, 239, 258.
180. Lewis, supra note 1, at 430-31.
181. Id. at 431.
182. Id.
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